Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12 IO-13 AID-05 EUR-12 HA-05 MCT-02 EB-08 TRSE-00 /126 W

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P R 081712Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9333
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 QUITO 6269

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, EC
SUBJECT: SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ANDEAN WAR
POSSIBILITIES

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ACTING FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY TOLD EMBOFF THAT CURRENT VISIT TO ECUADOR BY PERU'S NAVY MINISTER IS NOT WITHOUT ITS DANGERS. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT ECUADOREAN INTELLIGENCE INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF BEAGLE STRAIT ISLANDS NEXT MONTH AND SPECUALTED THAT PERU AND BOLIVIA MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CHILE'S SOUTHERN PROBLEM TO OCCUPY NORTHERN CHILE. HE PERCEIVED SOME RISK TO ECUADOR IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING CONVERSATION WITH POLCOUNS ON SEPTEMBER 6, ACTING FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY HERNAN VEINTIMILLA COMMENTED ON CURRENT VISIT OF PERUVIAN NAVY MINISTER ADMIRAL JORGE PARODI AND LAUNCHED INTO MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES FOR WAR IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.

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3. VEINTIMILLA DECLARED THAT THE GOE WAS AMBIVALENT TOWARD THE VISIT OF ADMIRAL PARODI, NOTING THAT WHILE IT HAD SOME OBVIOUS POSITIVE BENEFITS, THE GOE WAS NOT WITHOUT ITS MISGIVINGS. HE CHARACTERIZED PARODI AS A MODERATE AMONG THE PERUVIAN MILITARY WHO HAS ENJOYED EXCELLENT PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT POVEDA, CHIEF OF JOINT COMMAND

OLMEDO AND OTHERS IN THE ECUADOREAN HIGH COMMAND. ECUADOR BELIEVES THAT PARODI HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RESTRAINING MORE AGGRESSIVE PERUVIAN ELEMENTS IN THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD ECUADOR OVER THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. ON THE OTHER HAND, PERU HAS A HISTORY OF EXPLOITING SUCH VISITS FOR ITS OWN QUESTIONABLE PURPOSE. FOR INSTANCE, PERU CAN POINT TO SUCH VISITS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS WITHOUT DIFFICULTIES AND THEN BLAME ECUADOR FOR CREATING PROBLEMS ON THE BORDER, ETC. THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PERU-CHILE SITUATION WHERE A ROUGH MILITARY BALANCE EXISTS AND EXCHANGE OF VISITS CAN REDUCE TENSIONS. HOWEVER, PARODI'S VISIT WAS UNAVOIDABLE IN VIEW OF ADMIRAL OLMEDO'S VISIT TO PERU SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE.

4. VEINTIMILLA EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN FOR THE ANDEAN SITUATION IN GENERAL AND POSSIBLE PERUVIAN DESIGNS ON ECUADOR IN PARTICULAR. HE SAID THAT CURRENT CONCERNS CENTERED AROUND THE BEAGLE STRAIT PROBLEM AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES THERE WOULD CAUSE A CHAIN REACTION REACHING ECUADOR. ACCORDING TO ECUADOREAN INTELLIGENCE, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT ARGENTINA WILL ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY THE DISPUTED ISLANDS IN OCTOBER IN A LIGHTNING ATTACK AND CONSOLIDATE ITS GAINS BEFORE ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY CAN MOVE. IF SO, BOLIVIA, FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF CHILEAN ATTENTION CONFIDENTIAL

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TO ITS PROBLEM WITH ARGENTINA, MIGHT TRY TO ESTABLISH ITS CORRIDOR TO THE SEA IN CHILEAN TERRITORY. VEINTIMILLA BELIEVES THAT PERU MIGHT BE COLLABORATING WITH BOLIVIA IN ORDER TO SET UP A STALKING HORSE FOR ITS OWN INVASION AND CONSOLIDATION OF TERRITORY LOST TO CHILE IN 1879. HE DID NOT THINK THAT PERU WOULD FIRE THE FIRST SHOT, BUT IT WOULD HOPE THAT ITS ASSISTANCE TO "POOR LITTLE BOLIVIA" WOULD ENNOBLE ITS EFFORT BEFORE WORLD OPINION.

5. SHOULD PERU START FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH, CONTINUED VEINTIMILLA, IT WOULD ALSO LOOK TO PROTECT ITS NORTHERN FLANK AS WELL. IT COULD SIMPLY SEAL OFF THE BORDER, OR TAKE A MORE SERIOUS STEP OF KNOCKING OUT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. HE FELT THAT PERU MIGHT SUSPECT THAT ECUADOR HAD A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT WITH CHILE AND MIGHT ACT ON THAT BASIS. IN REALITY, VEINTIMILLA STATED, THERE WAS NO SUCH PACT, ALTHOUGH ONE HAD BEEN PROPOSED EARLIER WHICH THE FONOFF SHOT DOWN. HE ADDED THAT CHILE'S MILITARY WAS INTENT ON CREATING A WAR PSYCHOSIS AMONG THEIR ECUADOREAN COUNTERPARTS AND HAD PARTLY SUCCEEDED. THE FONOFF WAS CONVINCED, HE SAID, THAT CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH THE US, NOT AN ALLIANCE WITH CHILE, WAS ECUADOR'S BEST DETERRENT

AGAINST PERU AND FOR THIS REASON THE FONOFF HAD BEEN LOBBYING HARD FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE VULCAN/CHAPARRAL SYSTEM OVER ITS EUROPEAN COMPETITORS.

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6. VEINTIMILLA ALSO EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER PERU'S MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH ARGENTINA AIMRED AGAINST CHILE, THE COMMON HYPOTHETICAL ENEMY. HE REVEALED THAT GOE HAD A REPORT ALLEGING THAT PERU HAD SHIPPED SOME WAR MATERIAL TO ARGENTINA IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS, INDICATIVE OF SOME SORT OF COLLUSION. HE OBSERVED THAT ARGENTINA WAS VERY INFLUENTIAL WITH PERU AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN A POSITIVE FACTOR IN ECUADOR'S SECURITY PICTURE UP UNTIL NOW BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THAT THE ECUADOR HIGH COMMAND HAD FORMED WITH ARGENTINA'S ADMIRAL MASSERA. HOWEVER, WITH MASSERA'S PROXIMATE DEPARTURE AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY SOMEONE WHO WAS MORE PRO-PERU, ECUADOR WAS CONCERNED.

7. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH GOE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CAPABILITY IS QUESTIONABLE, THE INFORMATION AND ESTIMATES SUPPLIED BY VEINTIMILLA ARE WORTH DIGESTING AT LEAST AS INDICATIONS OF THE ECUADOREAN MIND AT THE MOMENT. VEINTIMILLA'S APPRAISAL OF WAR POSSIBILITIES DIFFERS FROM THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY/CIVILIAN ESTIMATE THAT WE ARE ACCUSTOMED TO CONFIDENTIAL

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HEARING INASMUCH AS HE ASSIGNS ECUADOR SECONDARY AND CONTINGENT ROLE IN ANY PERUVIAN ADVENTURE RATHER THAN CITING ECUADOR AS PERU'S PRINCIPAL TARGET BECAUSE OF ITS OIL FIELDS.

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